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Settling definitions is often seen as a central tool for clarifying concepts, and answering 
‘What is X?’ questions. Examples might be ‘What is knowledge?’, ‘What is a work of 
art?’ or ‘What is a dog?’. A common way of answering such questions is by formulating 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be of a certain sort. It is this form of real 
definition that is of concern here. They purport to identify essences. The argument will be 
that such definitions, if testable for adequacy, are redundant, and if not testable for 
adequacy, are merely stipulative. If they are stipulative, then they do not illuminate the 
real nature of anything, but merely set out how a word, or the concept that the word 
signifies, will be used. If a putative real definition is testable, then the definition was not 
needed in the first place, for the condition for it to be testable is that we know what falls 
under the definition independently of knowledge of the definition. Thus, the attempt to 
define things in real definitions is pointless as a substantive epistemic enterprise. But 
much of philosophy has supposed otherwise. The argument here has significant 
consequences for various important philosophical positions. Nothing said here claims that 
some particular relation between language and the world is the correct one. But it does 
show up difficulties for well-known accounts of the relation that have a venerable 




Suppose I wish to define what a dog is. The aim of such a definition is to enable me, 
when I encounter a certain thing in the world, to say whether it is a dog or not. One way 
of doing this is to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for a dog to be a dog, and 
not another kind of thing. This involves collating a set of features that all and only dogs 
have. If a thing has these features, it is a dog, and if it doesn’t have these features, then it 
is not a dog. Generally, these features figure in the definition as individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient. If a feature is necessary, but not sufficient, for a thing to be of a 
certain sort
1
, then nothing can be of that sort if it doesn’t have that feature. If a feature is 
sufficient, but not necessary, then if a thing has that feature it is a thing of a certain sort. 
 One way in which such real definitions are talked about is that they attempt to 
identify the essence of a thing: that without which a thing cannot be of a certain sort, and 
with which it is of a certain sort. The meaning of the definiendum is explained by the 
definiens, which, if correct, has the same meaning as the definiendum and identifies the 
essence of the thing under consideration, using ‘thing’ in its broadest sense. In these cases 
we define what a thing is, not that it is, unless, as is usual in the case of God, existence is 
included among the essential features. A thing will have accidental features in addition to 
its essential features; but considered as a thing of a certain sort these are not part of its 
essence and are not included in the definition because they are not part of what it is to be 
the sort of thing that it is. All and only things of a certain sort will have the essence that 
they do. 
 Much philosophical effort has gone into defining things, from Plato’s attempts 
through the good offices of Socrates to define justice, to recent efforts to, for example, 






 Such disputes are notable for their chronic irresolution. What is 
claimed in this paper perhaps explains why. It is inherent to the enterprise that there is no 
method for resolution.  
Yet such definitions are often presented as epistemically substantive, in the sense 
of claiming that they are what we need if we are to know whether the object in front of us 
is a work of art or not, and that without them we would not know what we are talking 
about when we talk about justice. We would not know that we were picking out an 
artwork or justice without such definitions, and if we do so correctly without grasping 
such definitions, it would be by a kind of luck. 
The argument presented here is that attempting real definitions is epistemically 
futile; they do not add to our knowledge or understanding of whatever it is we are talking 
about, nor do they aid our capacity to identify or recognise things of a certain kind when 
we encounter them. The argument does not depend on the special difficulty of 
formulating a definition, as can arise, for some particular kinds of things. This is not the 
issue. The argument here operates against any attempt to present real definitions that 
would sort objects in the world into different classes of things in other than a stipulative 
manner.
2
 A stipulative definition indicates merely how a word, or the concept the word 
signifies, will, and by fiat should, be used.  
 Let us return to our attempt to define a dog example. Suppose we propose a set of 
features that will pick out all and only dogs. If something is a dog it has these features, 
and anything that doesn’t have these features isn’t a dog. What we have here is a 
proposed real definition. Again, let us not dwell on the particular difficulty of defining a 
dog; nothing hangs on whether dogs are more or less difficult to define than anything 
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else. Choose another example of a sort of object in the world if you prefer. An artwork, 
for example. 
 We are usually encouraged, indeed required, to test a definition by considering 
examples of things to see if the definition is adequate. Examples may of course be 
hypothetical. In theory the examples could be anything you like whatsoever; that they 
characteristically are not is, I believe, symptomatic of the fundamental difficulty explored 
here. Often the definition is said to fail because it is too broad and includes things that are 
not dogs, or it is said to fail because it is too narrow and fails to include things that are 
dogs. But some thought about this, I contend, shows that the request to test the definition 
by the standard method is either impossible or pointless. 
 Suppose someone opens the door in which the dog-defining activity is going on 
and brings something in. Here’s an example with which we may test the definition - or so 
the story goes. How are we to decide whether the thing brought in is a thing that reveals 
the adequacy or inadequacy of the definition? Suppose we are able to decide that the 
thing brought in is a dog, but would not be included under the proposed definition of 
‘dog’. We might say that in that case we perfectly show that our definition may provide 
the sufficient but not the necessary features of a dog, and so is inadequate. All the things 
that have the proposed features in the definition are dogs, but there are some things, 
including the thing just brought in, that do not have these features that are also dogs. The 
same applies to the definition as a sufficient condition, but in this case we bring 
something in and we identify it as something that is not a dog, but according to the 
definition is; again the definition has been shown to be inadequate. Note, that what is at 
issue here when referring to adequacy and inadequacy in the case of real definitions is 
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truth and falsity, not just pragmatic convenience or inconvenience or reference to the 
facts of usage. The real definition, if it is a good one, is supposed to be true about 
something in the world - the essential nature of a dog that all and only dogs have that 
differentiates them from all other things that are not dogs - and the definition is false 
otherwise. 
But how is this test supposed to work? If we are able to identify the thing brought 
in as a dog, then there is no need for a definition of a dog at all. As something aimed at 
our being able to pick out dogs from other things it is redundant because we were clearly 
able to do it anyway. If this were not so, moreover, no true test of the definition would be 
possible. 
Of course, the alternative is what might be called a false test. In this case someone 
brings something in and we are, as before, to decide whether it is a dog or not. One way 
might be to consult the proposed definition of ‘dog’. If it fits the definition then it’s a 
dog, and if it fails to fit the definition then it isn’t a dog. But this makes any notion of 
testing the definition utterly fallacious, as the identification of the thing before us as a dog 
or not a dog is determined by the very definition the thing is supposed to test. In other 
words, the test is spurious because it is viciously circular. The thing is a dog or not a dog 
‘by definition’, as the saying goes. But if this is so then the definition is purely 
stipulative, or must be considered so. It is determined by fiat that anything that falls under 
it is a thing of a certain sort and anything that doesn’t isn’t. It is perfectly proper for us to 
check whether a thing falls under a stipulative definition by consulting the definition, and 
no accusation of circularity would be appropriate. But the price for this is that such 
definitions tell us nothing about things in the world and how they might fall into different 
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sorts of things. It merely says in an authoritarian manner: this is how the word ‘dog’, say, 
will be used. It tells us nothing about dogs. The definition is in a sense totally arbitrary, 
although we may have our extraneous motives for formulating it in the way that we do. A 
stipulative definition, as it were, chops the world up into kinds; it does not, as a real 
definition is supposed to do, map how the world chops itself up into kinds.  
What is pointed to here is a definitional paradox. If real definitions may be tested 
then we don’t need the definitions, for in order to test the definition we have to be able to 
identify putative test examples as things of a certain sort independently of the definition. 
If we do not identify these putative examples as examples of a certain sort independently 
of the definition under test, but rather by consulting the definition, then it cannot amount 
to a test of the definition. 
What should we conclude about real definitions then? That they cannot operate 
as, or be proffered as, more than stipulative definitions. We may even grant that things 
may in fact have essences; they may have necessary and sufficient sets of features that 
make them the certain kind of thing that they are; some real definitions may in fact even 
be correct. They may correspond to the essence of a certain sort of thing; they may do 
this by correctly collating the necessary and sufficient features for a thing to be a certain 
sort of thing. But there is a sceptical problem immovably in place as to how any of these 
claims can ever be known. 
 If we are of an anti-realist bent we might be led to argue that it makes no sense 
even to make the truth-claims just made about essences and identifying them for what 
they are. If one were inclined in a realist direction one might argue that it makes sense to 
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make such claims, that they may be true or false, even though we are logically blocked 
from verifying them. 
The problems outlined here about determining the adequacy of real definitions 
may have serious consequences for the current fashionable revival of essentialism.
3
 
Essentialism, if it is to be more than promissory, involves the derivation of substantial 
definitions of sortal concepts aimed at revealing the essences or real natures of entities in 
the world. This is no trivial matter, as some now see this kind of knowledge as 
contributing to a substantive metaphysics, and as supporting the reality, for example, of 
necessary causal connections - laws of nature that are metaphysically necessary - over 
and above the empirical evidence alone that at best supports, it is said, mere contingent 
regularity. The targets of such essential revelation by definition are often what get called 
natural kinds. Things may have essential properties, although one may argue on various 
grounds against this; but if we have no way of testing the proposed collation of essential 
properties captured in a putative real definition, then it may turn out that the attempt to 
extend our knowledge of the world through the capturing of such essences is futile. It is 
no use pointing to examples or counterexamples of the sort of thing under definition in 
order to test the adequacy or inadequacy - truth or falsity - of the proposed real definition, 
for in order for us to know they are examples or counterexamples at all we would already 
have to know what it is that makes a thing that sort of thing - but allowing us to make that 
distinction in a non-conventional or arbitrary manner was surely the whole point of the 
real definition. If identifying essences is important for knowing what things really are, 
then we are in dire straits, because none of the proposed definitions required for the task 
can be known to be true or false. It seems that to test the definition and determine 
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whether it is true or false, we would already need to know whether it is true or false. This 
can’t be right of course. 
One might contend that I am setting up an Aunt Sally here, and that unarticulated 
recognitional ability is the answer to the way that we test real definitions and that real 
definitions merely articulate an ability we have inchoately. But this won’t do for two 
reasons.  
First, it flies in the face of what has historically often been claimed as the 
philosophical function of real definitions. When Socrates questions people about justice 
he usually does so in order to show that they really don’t know what they are talking 
about when they talk about justice, and he does this by showing that on their vague 
understanding - one that has yet to identify the true essence of justice itself - they are not 
picking out cases of justice whose nature they are yet to articulate clearly, but are picking 
out cases that are not cases of justice at all. And this is because they don’t know what 
‘justice’ truly means, and thus is. 
Second, for the recognitional ability to work as a way of testing real definitions, 
we would have to suppose that our recognitions were strictly accurate and reliable. The 
examples presented as tests couldn’t be tests for or against a proposed definition 
otherwise, because we wouldn’t know how to regard them. The recognitions have to be 
strictly accurate and reliable and known to be so, otherwise we could not be sure our real 
definitions would turn out correct on the basis of them. Without such knowledge, 
examples could be regarded as counterexamples, and vice versa, and we would from this 
produce a real definition of the kind under consideration that is bound to be incorrect or 
false. It’s not enough that our identifications are determinedly accurate or inaccurate. We 
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need to know which is which. That is, which is an example and which a counterexample. 
In order to do that we would have to articulate our grounds for the recognition and justify 
our determinations. To do that with strict reliability and accuracy we would already have 
to know we had the correct real definition, for ex hypothesi that - as claimed by those 
who might take us down the route of articulating recognition ability as solving the 
problem of how real definitions may be known to be true or false - was their function and 
value. Again we can’t test a real definition by examples and counterexamples unless we 
have grounds for knowing which count as examples and which as counterexamples with 
regard to the proposed real definition; but in order to do that we would have to know we 
had the correct real definition, for only in that way in the end may we surely tell which is 
which. So, we’re back to square one.  
It might be, then, that recognitional ability is foundational and should not be seen 
as a mere stepping stone to, or superseded by, a supposedly proper understanding of the 
objects we recognise as captured, allegedly, in putative real definitions. 
 Clearly there must be ways in which we know the identity of things classed into 
sorts of things that do not involve real definitions that purport to reveal essences. Real 
definitions are not the way we determine whether a thing is of a certain sort or not where 
necessary and sufficient conditions are involved, except in cases where the definition is 
admitted to be purely stipulative. It could be that we should accept that all our definitions 
couched in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions are really stipulative, and that 
definitions may in no way give us knowledge of the world. It is often supposed, however, 
that the world, as they say, carves itself at the joints into different sorts of things; that 
there is a real distinction between the tree and the earth the tree grows out of that is not 
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dependent on our happening to want to discriminate between them for arbitrary or 
practical purposes entirely of our own. But it’s possible that this isn’t true. Without 
language to shape the world, it may be argued, all is an undifferentiated oneness. In any 
event it certainly looks on the basis of the arguments here, I contend, that we may have to 
operate as if all we have is stipulative definitions insofar as definitions involve being 
spelt out in necessary and sufficient conditions, for we seem unable to know whether any 
such definitions proposed as real definitions are true or false, adequate or inadequate. 
How we come to be able to group individual things into sorts of things is the 
subject of another paper. But it certainly does not seem to be because of the application 
of real definitions. Not only do we not in fact use them, we could not use them unless we 
admit our sorting to be arbitrary. Indeed the theory of how real definitions are constructed 
and tested is incoherent taken in isolation and rests clearly on some other more 
fundamental way of sorting things into kinds on which the methods proposed for testing 
real definitions logically depend. Yet it is real definitions in particular that have often 
been set forth in philosophy as the apogee of the definitional art and that give us 
knowledge about the world if any definitions can. At the same time they are contrasted 
with other lesser breeds of definition, some of which hardly merit the name, which are 
not supposed to give us deep insight into the nature of reality, but instead at best record 
the way we choose or come to use words. The coarse, fuzzy, lesser breeds of definition - 
lexical, nominal, ostensive - are supposed to give way to the sophistication of real 
definition as the ideal way of defining things. They alone reveal the fundamental reason 
why things fall into different kinds, as we supposed dimly they do suggested by our lesser 
breed of definitions. On this view, such lesser definitions are best considered as impure 
 11 
stepping stones on the way to real definitions. Yet it turns out it is the lesser breeds that 
are logically foundational to our being able to differentiate things into different kinds, and 
they are not to be superseded or refined away. 
No-one identifies dogs by consulting the real definition of a dog, and if he did he 
would be presuming something to which he is not entitled: that the definition is known to 
be correct. He can only know that if he supposes that real definitions are not how we 
know that things fall into different kinds. Fortunately, we know a dog when we see one, 
and damned quickly too. It’s a bit rough and ready, but perfectly adequate for avoiding 
getting bitten. Perhaps the same applies (except the being bitten part) to the other 
examples mentioned of knowledge, justice, and artwork; and of course to other concepts 
and the things to which they refer, many of which occupy a central place in philosophy. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Oswald Hanfling (ed), Philosophical Aesthetics (Oxford and Milton Keynes: Blackwell and Open 
University, 1992), Essay 1, pp.1-40. 
2
 I do not include lexical definitions as what might be going on here because such definition are not usually 
give in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather by the use of a synonym or synonyms for 
the definiendum; this may amount to a description, but it rarely purports to unearth the essence of the thing 
to which the concept defined refers. A lexical definition merely records how a word is used and, 
constrained by some notion of the limits of correctness, recommends that this be followed as a guide to 
how it should be used. 
3
 This has been so in metaphysics generally and in philosophy of science in particular. See, for example, 
Brian Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and of course many 
other recent works. 
4
 I’d like to thank Constantine Sandis for his comments on a draft of this essay. 
